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Abstract—Electronic exam systems are pieces of software
employed in online educations to assess performances of students.
However, both the security of the protocols they reply upon and
a general understanding of the possible threats is still to be
met. This manuscript outlines a Ph.D. research work wherein we
attempt to shed some light in the area. We identify the phases
composing a typical exam system, we comments on relevant
security properties that should be preserved in the various phases,
and we advances an informal though structured definitions of
them.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic exam (e-exam) systems are the new frontier in
computer-based assessment and remote education. They are
complex systems involving a number of parties such as exam-
ination authorities, candidates, invigilators, examiners. They
rely on information and communication technology (ICT) at
different degrees. For example, they can combine traditional
pencil-and-paper assessment procedures with some level of
automatic digital data processing (e.g., exam sheets can be
scanned and transmitted to examiners for marking), or they
can be fully computerized. In this case students take exams
by interacting with a electronic device in either invigilated or
non-invigilated environments.
E-exams are believed to promote quality and equity in
education because they are supposed to offer objective evalu-
ations of written exams and equal access to anyone. Example
of e-exam systems are those used by the Educational Testing
Service (ETS - http:\\www.ets.org) to run the IELTS [1], the
GRE [2] and the TOEFL [3]. These tests evaluate every year
the ability to use and understand English of millions of people
from hundreds of different countries. Formerly deployed as
traditional paper-based supervised tests, they have been re-
engineered to be computer-based. The European Computer
Driving License Foundation (ECDL - http:\\www.ecdl.com)
employs supervised e-exam systems to assess basic skills and
competencies for a proficient use of computers and com-
mon computer applications. Also the European Union adopts
computer-based e-exam in the selection procedure for perma-
nent and non permanent job positions for all the EU institutions
(http:\\europa.eu/epso/apply/how apply/index en.htm).
A. The massive growth
In the last years e-exam systems have gained importance
as a result of increasing interest in “Massive Open On-
line Courses” (MOOCs), the on-line platforms for a large-
scale interactive participation and open access to courses and
lectures via the web. MOOCs take advantage of various web-
based technologies including video presentation and social
networks to give students access to course contents. Platforms
such as ‘edX’ (https://www.edX.org), ‘Coursera’ (https://www.
coursera.org), and ‘Udacity’ (https://www.udacity.com) count
already hundred of partners among which top-tier institutions
such as Harvard, Stanford and MIT. Relevantly, MOOCs
support e-exams as they offer internet-based assessment and
remote marking for formative and summative tests.
B. Education in security
Whether e-exams, either in MOOCs or in other educational
frameworks, will be capable to sustain and forward quality in
education is a question that goes beyond the scope of our
research. Beyond our interest is also to question how fair is to
leave machines mark written tests. This issue, debated in [4],
is contrasted by many institutions that prefer to have human
to evaluate tests. But, whatever the framework and the way of
marking tests, e-exams will fail their mission unless designed
to be robust to frauds.
The risk of forgery is high, since almost all roles have
an interest in behaving selfishly. Students may aim to get
the highest marks with the least effort, a goal they can get
by copying and other cheating. Also authorities may have
motivation to tamper with the assessment results. For instance,
in the scandal known as Atlanta Cheating1 about 35 people
among school administrators, educators, and superintendents
manipulated ranks and scores with the goal of gaining more
school governmental funds. Collusions among parties are also
possible: authorities can try to interfere with the exam process
for reason of favouritisms, nepotisms, or partisanship in favour
of some candidates or candidate’s supporters.
Such frauds are well known. To reduce the likelihood of
cheating, in fact, traditional exams adopt procedures that have
been built after years of experiences. On the contrary e-exam
systems, regardless if the are invigilated and taken in reliable
testing centres, are unprotected because of their using ICT.
The shifting from traditional assessment procedures to the
computer-based ones is critical. Unless different defences are
in place to preserve the security properties provided by pre-
vious pencil-and-paper solutions, it will make the assessment
process vulnerable to attacks and to frauds.
Indeed, even a general understanding of the security prop-
erties for pencil-and-paper exam systems is not documented
anywhere. There is no list of security requirements, whereas
the use of communication technologies, such as the Internet,
will further expose e-exam systems to new threats which are
impossible in the traditional setting.
1See “Atlanta Cheating Scandal”, CNN.com, April 2013
The security properties that e-exam system protocols and
processes aim to withstand, as well as the threats that they
should thwart, should still meet a general understanding and
clear specifications.
C. Checking our homework
Our goal is to set a framework for the study of security of
e-exams. Ideally, security should not depend on trusted hard-
ware, trusted parties, or trusted authorities; systems should be
resilient to malicious threats even if they come from supposed
honest elements or principals. Implementations should be, at
least in some form, verifiable/auditable, accountable, or both.
Verifiability has been explored in application domains
close to e-exams, namely e-voting and e-auction. In e-voting,
universal verifiability (e.g., see [5]) states that a voter (resp.,
anyone) can verify the correctness of the voting results by
using only public data. In e-auction, verifiability has been
defined in [6] as the quality of allowing anyone (i.e., the
winner, the seller, and the losers) to test the auction process
and its output for integrity (e.g., only legitimate bids have been
processed, the winning bid is the highest price, the loosing bids
cannot win) provided that participants followed the auction
protocol correctly.
Auditability is often considered as synonym for verifiabil-
ity, although in certain contexts it may be seen as a weaker
property. If the system has been designed in such a way to have
data log, which may not be public, an auditable system allows
an auditor to check for frauds once they have occurred (e.g.,
see [7]). Accountability [8] ensures that also the perpetrator
can be identified.
II. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
Our research attempts to define a research roadmap in the
area of secure, verifiable, and accountable e-exam systems. We
have identified three specific research objectives, each driven
by concrete research questions.
Objective 1 - formalization of properties: The first
objective is to clarify what are the security properties that
are relevant for an e-exam system. In so doing, we have to
define a model for an exam system, that is, to identify the
typical phases that compose it and the roles therein involved.
This paper already advances the description of such phases.
Moreover, it proposes informal though structured definitions
of related security properties (see Sect. III). A formal speci-
fication of such properties in a process algebra of choice is
then within reach, although it is difficult to anticipate whether
standard analysis tools can be efficiently used to check them
automatically.
Comparing the security properties of e-exams with the ones
of e-voting is an interesting part of this research objective.
Properties such as vote anonymity and privacy, vote integrity
and verifiability have surely some relevance in e-exams too,
but in the context of e-exams they become more complicated
and thus interesting to be fully understood, characterized, and
studied. For example, while a vote must never be associated to
its voter, an exam form should ideally be marked anonymously
but eventually associated to its author.
Objective 2 - verification of security properties: The
second objective is to verify whether existing e-exam protocols
yield the security properties we have identified in objective
1. Also here we take inspiration from works in the related
domains of e-voting and e-auction, whose results and research
on security issues have been increased significantly in the
last years (e.g., see [9], [10], [11]). Works on e-auction are
yet preliminary (e.g., see [6]), but still inspiring. As threat
analysis, we plan to adopt the approach already experimented
in the Preˆt a` Voter verifiable voting system [12]. We intend to
follow a formal method approach, possibly using the ‘applied-
pi calculus’ and its model checker ProVerif [13], tools that have
been proved of great flexibility in modelling voting and auction
systems together with their relative security properties (e.g.,
see [14], [15], [16], [17]). We deliberately choose to analyse
protocols that belong to different categories of e-exams. In
particular, we refer to WATA [18], which is a computer-assisted
exam protocol, and an internet-based protocol due to Huszti
et al. [19].
Objective 3 - security design: The third research ob-
jective is more ambitious and likely to be left only when
the other two will be achieved. It is about to design at
least one new e-exam scheme that ensures relevant security
properties that are missing by the systems analysed within the
objective 2. The design of new protocols that meet our security
requirements in each phase of the competition is challenging
due to non-trivial problems, such as combining contradictory
security requirements (anonymity vs. authentication) or having
lightweight reliance upon trusted parties. These issues can be
tackled by applying security mechanisms such as decryption
mixes [20], conditional privacy [21], ElGamal encryption, and
visual cryptography mechanisms [22], some of which have
been already applied in e-voting. Again we aim at looking at
this domain to find the right tools and methodologies of design.
Part of this goal is to propose a design that mitigates strong
trust requirements, for example by substitute fully trusted
parties with lightweight trusted third party as done in [23].
III. WHAT IS IN PROGRESS
A. E-exams: Players and Phases
We have identified the players and the phases that compose
a general e-exam process.
Players: An e-exam has at least two kinds of partici-
pants: the candidates, who intend to sit for the exam, and the
examiner, who marks the answer submitted by candidates. This
model can capture face-to-face examination such as periodical
academic assessment, in which the examiner also manages
the exam procedures. In other situations, such as qualifying
examination or internet-based exam, it seems to be more
appropriate to assign the role of managing the exam procedures
to an examination authority, limiting the duties of examiners
to the evaluation of answers. The examination authority can be
further split into different roles according to specific exams:
invigilators ensure that no candidate cheats, while question
committees generate exam questions.
The participants outlined above may potentially act malev-
olently and even collude. Interestingly, this poses different
threat models that depend on the malicious participants.
Phases: A typical e-exam can be conveniently split up
into four different phases: registration, examination, marking,
and notification. At registration, the examination authority
creates a new examination and checks eligibility of the can-
didates who attempt to register for it. Only candidates who
pass the standard eligibility criteria, such as payment of fees
and previous qualifications, get successfully registered. At
examination, each registered candidate gets an exam form with
questions, answers the questions, and submits her answer to
the examination authority. The exam form may also include
the candidate’s identification details. The examination phase
should be supervised in order to ensure that no candidate
cheats. At marking, the exam form is eventually given to the
examiner, who marks the answer. The exam form should not
reveal the real identity of the candidate to ensure anonymous
marking. The exam terminates with the notification, in which
marks are assigned to their respective candidates. Assigning
a mark means that each candidate is delivered her mark.
Depending on a specific exam, the delivery can be remotely or
de visu. The latter is the case when the answers are evaluated
immediately after the examination by means of electronic
marker.
B. Categories of E-exams and Security Properties
We have identified the categories of e-exams and listed
relevant security properties common to those categories.
Categories: E-exams differ from traditional pencil-and-
paper exams because they employ partially or completely ICT.
An e-exam can be computer-assisted, when ICT is used in
any phase of the exam. For example, when the examination
is accomplished by paper-based forms, while registration and
notification are carried out remotely. An e-exam is computer-
based when the exam is taken on computers, or finally it can
be internet-based when the exam activity requires the use of
the internet.
Security Properties: Despite the evident differences
among the three categories, the distinction in players, the
various items, and even the security properties that are spelled
out below can be instantiated on each of them. For example,
the ‘exam form’ is, for paper-based exams, the piece of paper
where the candidate enters her answer, while it is a file for
computer-based or internet-based exams. In the latter case,
the invigilators can be validation pieces of software filming
a candidate while she is filling up the form with her answers,
and also sealing the association between the video and the
filled form.
Having clarified the players, the phases, and the categories
that characterize e-exam systems, we introduce and comment
a set of security properties. The set is not meant to be com-
prehensive but includes what we think are the most relevant
properties for each phase.
Registration Phase:
Property 1 (Candidate Eligibility): Only candidates who
pass the official eligibility criteria for an exam get the cre-
dentials to register for that exam.
This properties ensures that only who is eligible for an exam
will be able to participate to it and thus to appear in the
registration list for that exam.
Examination Phase:
Property 2 (Candidate Identification): The identity of a
registered candidate is correctly verified.
Candidate identification can be established by checking the
candidate’s valid ID token (e.g., a student card) in face-to-face
exams. Credentials given at registration can also be checked
for authenticating the candidate in remote exams.
Property 3 (Candidate Authorization): Only a candidate
who has registered for an exam can participate to that exam.
Candidate authorization follows from verifying that the au-
thenticated candidate is also in the list of registered candidates
produced during the registration phase and made available at
examination phase.
Property 4 (Form Authentication): An exam form is cor-
rectly associated to the authorized candidate who is taking
that exam.
Personal details of the authorized candidate can lay on the
candidate’s exam form. For traditional exams, the examiner can
check that the candidate writes down the right personal details
on the form, or she can write them down personally. However,
we stress that the exam form is intended to contain the answer,
thus it does not necessarily include the candidate’s detail and
other strategies are possible. For computer exams, the examiner
could equally check what details the candidate enters. For
remote exams, remote validation software is necessary.
Property 5 (Answer Authorship): The answer of a candi-
date gets correctly associated with the candidate’s authenti-
cated form.
This property says that a candidate’s answer can never be
associated with another form but hers, as it happens when two
candidates swap their forms. It can be satisfied by establishing
form authentication and enforced by the invigilators.
Marking Phase:
Property 6 (Form Integrity): No one can alter the forms
after they have been submitted by the candidates.
An answer cannot be modified after the candidate submits it
in her exam form. Likewise, it ensures that her form cannot
be illicitly assigned to anyone else.
Property 7 (Anonymous Marking): The examiner cannot
associate an answer to any candidate.
This version of anonymous marking signifies that the examiner
marks a form while ignoring its author — it can contribute to
the fairness of the marking.
Property 8 (Strong Anonymous Marking): No one but the
candidates can associate an answer to any candidate.
The strong version of anonymous marking says that also the
examination authority is unaware of the author of an answer
while the answer is being marked. An implication is that
a candidate anonymity during the marking will even resist
collusion of examiner and examination authority.
Notification Phase:
Property 9 (Mark Integrity): The mark that the examiner
gives to the form on behalf of a candidate is assigned to that
candidate only.
Once the examiner produces an official mark for a candidate,
the mark cannot be changed, and will be officially linked to
that candidate.
Property 10 (Mark Privacy): The association between an
answer and its corresponding mark is not known to any
candidate than the author of the answer.
This property ensures that the mark assigned to a candidate is
known only to her and possibly to the examination authority,
which assigns the mark.
IV. RELATED WORK
The research community has shown interest in e-exam
security only recently. Invigilation software such as [24], is
the result of the increasing popularity of MOOCs. However,
invigilation tackles only one of the possible threats in e-exam,
that is, candidate cheating. Malicious examiners and exam
authorities should be also considered as realistic threats in e-
exam environment.
To our knowledge, there is no work that has a formal
approach in analysing the security properties for e-exam.
Unlike similar systems (i.e, e-voting and e-auction), works
on e-exams focuses only on the design, omitting a rigorous
security analysis of the proposed scheme.
Currently, the most comprehensive work is due to Huszti et
al. [19]. They propose an internet-based protocol that aims to
achieve a number of security properties, without the existence
of a Trusted Third Party. The authors claim to accomplish the
security requirements by applying three main cryptographic
building blocks: ElGamal encryption, reusable anonymous
return channel, and timed-release service. However, the paper
provides only an informal analysis of the security property.
Bella et al. propose WATA [18], a computer-assisted system
that uses conventional printouts and gives the ability to de-
anonymise an exam solely to its author. The system can be
managed remotely and is employed to evaluate master students.
The protocol and its security analysis are presented rather
informally.
NEMO-SCAN [25] uses a patented anonymity paper cover:
one part hides the candidate details, while another contains
a section in which examiners write the marks down. At
notification time, a scanner with a proprietary software scans
the paper with the candidate details, and assigns it the mark.
The system is primarily meant to achieve anonymous marking,
while it is not clear if it possesses other related security
properties.
Other works focus on countermeasures to avoid cheating
during online exams [26], [27], [28], and advance methods to
ensure the authentication of the candidates [29], [30]. However,
such methods assume full trusted examination authorities, and
preclude anonymous marking.
Several papers study the security properties of e-learning
systems [31], [32]. In particular, relevant works analyse au-
thentication and privacy issues of teachers and students, and
propose some ideas on how ensure security in such systems
[33]. However, major risks of e-learning appear to be signif-
icantly different from ones of e-exams. While the former are
more susceptible to external threats, e-exams have to tackle
more with insider threats, such as cheating candidate or corrupt
examiners.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND ONGOING WORK
Despite the widespread use and importance of e-exam
systems implementing various dedicated protocols, research in
this area only seems to be at its dawn. Certain institutions still
rely on an ‘anonymising office’ that gives each candidate a
pseudonym. The candidate has to write the pseudonym down
in the exam form at examination phase, with the purpose of
hiding the candidate’s identity during the marking. However,
candidates have to trust the anonymising office not to collude
with the examiner.
This abstract conjectured that removing such trust by
means of an anonymous marking property is perhaps the
main raison d’eˆtre of a modern e-exam protocol. This and
other properties are oriented at protecting the candidate from
both examiner and examination authority, and hence appear to
come into play at marking and notification phase. By contrast,
properties of the registration and examination phases aim to
protect the authorities from cheating candidates.
Our ongoing work is to analyse existing e-exam protocols
(e.g., [19], [18]). Informal reasoning and initial attempts at
formalisation have already shown a number of weaknesses.
These appear to justify the design of a new hierarchy of e-
exam protocols that compel participants to only see a share of
sensitive information such as the candidate personal informa-
tion during marking.
This research has just started, but has already clarified
that e-exams properties differ from and seem to complicate
their nearest relatives, which are e-voting and e-auctions. For
example, a high-level property of e-exams is that answer au-
thorship should be preserved even in the presence of colluding
candidates. Conversely, vote authorship is not a problem for
e-voting, in fact unlinkability between voter and vote is a
desired property. Strong anonymous marking, which is meant
to hold during the marking but will be trivially falsified after
notification, evaluates to a sort of fixed-term anonymity, which
is eventually going to be resolved. This is more in line with the
properties of a sealed e-auction winning bid than with those
of an e-voting ballot. However, the threat models for e-exams
and e-auctions seem different: while collusion between candi-
dates results appropriate for e-exams, competitiveness among
bidders motivates e-auctions. Validating these observations is
our goal for the near future.
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